You bet No thanks. API Reference.
CallLog The CallLog object represents an entry in the call log of the phone application. Supported Platform s. Configuration Document Settings. To use all of the API described for this object, you must ensure the following settings are in your configuration document: You must declare the feature element s below in your configuration document: Feature ID BB5. If not found, the raw phone number is returned. Documentation generated by JsDoc Toolkit 2. Last modified: By late , Android commanded This post-iPhone period was an era of strategic confusion for RIM.
The overall state of the industry "was a bit schizophrenic," said Patrick Spence, RIM's former executive vice-president of global sales, who left in Then it shifted to a period of trying to drive much more usage in different packages, when the iPhone became compelling. If there were new rules of the game, RIM would require new tools. The summer after the Storm launched, Mr. Lazaridis bought Torch Mobile, a software development firm that created Internet browsers for mobile phones.
But the process of moving, or "porting," the Torch browser onto RIM's highly-customized system proved complex and time-consuming. RIM's technology was based on Java computer code and an operating system built in the s, while the Apple and Android systems used newer software platforms and standards that made it easier to build friendlier user interfaces.
Lazaridis said. RIM executives figured they had time to reinvent the company. For years they had successfully fended off a host of challengers. Apple's aggressive negotiating tactics had alienated many carriers, and the iPhone didn't seem like a threat to RIM's most loyal base of customers — businesses and governments. They would sustain RIM while it fixed its technology issues.
But smartphone users were rapidly shifting their focus to software applications, rather than choosing devices based solely on hardware. The company's engineering culture had served it well when it delivered efficient, low-power devices to enterprise customers. But features that suited corporate chief information officers weren't what appealed to the general public. Consumers would say, 'I want a faster browser. Trying to satisfy its two sets of customers — consumers and corporate users — could leave the company satisfying neither.
When RIM executives showed off plans to add camera, game and music applications to its products to several hundred Fortune chief information officers at a company event in Orlando in , they weren't prepared for the backlash that followed. Large corporate customers didn't want personal applications on corporate phones, said a former RIM executive who attended the session. Meanwhile, it turned out consumers didn't care so much about battery life or security features. They wanted apps. Apple's iOs and Google's Android systems were relatively easy for outside software developers to use, compared to BlackBerry's technically complicated Java-based system.
Blackberry's apps looked "uglier" than those programmed in more modern languages, and the simulator used to test the apps often didn't recreate the actual experience, said Trevor Nimegeers, a Calgary-based entrepreneur whose software company, Wmode, has developed apps for BlackBerry. Further, RIM exerted tight control over developers before it would sign off on their apps for use on BlackBerrys, stifling creativity. Nimegeers said. As a result, hot apps such as Instagram and Tumblr bypassed BlackBerry. One key to RIM's early success was its corporate structure.
It is unusual for a company to have two CEOs — Mr. Lazaridis focused on engineering, product management and supply chain, while Mr. Balsillie looked after sales, finance and other corporate functions — but for a long time, it worked. Lazaridis's side of the shop made the phones, and Mr. Balsillie's sold them. The two men were collegial and collaborative. Below the top executives, however, the two sides of the company didn't always get along.
That contributed to a chronic problem for RIM: Sometimes, feedback from customers that might inspire changes would die at middle management, because senior executives didn't want to bring it to Mr. Lazaridis, a former insider said. The split company also lost a major unifying force when chief operating officer Larry Conlee retired in Conlee was a whip-cracker who held executives to account for decisions and deadlines, establishing a project management office.
Many insiders agreed that after he left, a slack attitude toward hitting targets began to permeate the company. After relying on its own technology for so long, Mr. Lazaridis decided the company's next advance would come from outside. Lazaridis knew the company needed.
QNX was a specialist in industrial controls that used up-to-date software tools to run applications ranging from call centres to wireless broadband services in vehicles.
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Its technology was the perfect core for smartphones and tablets, RIM's leaders felt. Lazaridis decided to take a page from the business strategy book The Innovator's Dilemma by Clayton Christensen. The book outlines how established organizations that succeeded against challengers often did so by allowing small, cloistered teams to develop their own disruptive products, free from the influence of the rest of the organization. Lazaridis decided he would isolate the QNX team and get them to focus solely on the new operating system, while leaving existing programmers to work on products for its existing platform, BlackBerry 7.
But first, RIM had to answer a key question: Should it move over some of its old Java-based applications, or rewrite them all from scratch? If the company abandoned Java altogether, what would it mean for third-party developers who used it? These were not easy decisions. Discussions among the senior leaders in Mr. Lazaridis' organization dragged on for a year — far too long, according to several insiders. Eventually, the decision was made: BlackBerry 10 would be built from scratch. The problem with that approach was that a new team was being entrusted to recreate the BlackBerry.
Those who had created the original system were still working on devices for the BlackBerry 7 platform. Once again, the company was split. But the BB7 was late," Mr. Lazaridis saw the work as a precursor to the BlackBerry 10 line of smartphones and was impressed by what the team brought to the product. But the QNX team was overwhelmed and needed to draw heavily on the company's other resources to complete the PlayBook.
Similar issues arose later on the BlackBerry The tablet, originally slated to come out in the fall of , didn't appear until April, , and it failed to sell. It was an awkward accessory to RIM's smartphones, and lacked e-mail, contacts and apps. Once again, RIM had missed the mark: Tablets that sold well worked as standalone devices, which the PlayBook wasn't.
Some questioned the wisdom of launching the PlayBook in the first place, feeling it was a needless and costly distraction.sighparageekscomp.cf/choices-a-physicians-journey-on-two-continents.php
CallLog - HTML5/WebWorks for BB OS - BlackBerry Developer
And the decision to isolate QNX also created tensions and morale problems: Those who weren't on the team worried about their future. Meanwhile, RIM's lack of an advanced smartphone meant that it continued to bleed market share to Apple and Android, especially in the United States. In December, , Verizon Wireless announced it would invest in fourth generation 4G LTE technology to accommodate the growing demands of customers who wanted to surf the Internet on their phones.
It signalled to device makers that it would look to feature 4G smartphones in its marketing. RIM executives tried to make an engineering argument to carriers that 4G technology was no more efficient than 3G, and that its Bold phones were just fine. Lazaridis, Mr. Heins and chief technology officer David Yach "were trying to reshape the argument because they knew our products couldn't go there," a former executive said.
BlackBerry: is this RIP for BBM?
We lost channel support and feature ads. The PlayBook debacle and mounting delays of the BlackBerry 10 harmed the organization in other ways. For years, Mr. Yach and Mr. Lazaridis had enjoyed a close working relationship. But as the well-regarded Mr. Yach began to question the company's ability to hit deadlines on products, his views were dismissed and he was made to feel he wasn't a team player, damaging their relationship, observers said. He left the company in early The PlayBook flop merely added to the sense of a company in decline; became a significant turning point for RIM.
The pressure mounted on Mr. Balsillie, Mr. Lazaridis and the board. In January, , they stepped aside as co-CEOs and handed it over to Thorsten Heins, a German executive who had run the company's handset division. Almost immediately, there was division about how to roll out the BlackBerry The original strategy had called for the company to launch an all-touchscreen version first, because sales were still going well for the company's BlackBerry 7 keyboard phone.
But by , sales of BlackBerry 7 phones had lost steam, and Mr. Lazaridis, now deputy chairman, felt the company should switch its priority to getting a keyboard version out, to meet the demand from BlackBerry die-hards. Heins's new management team held firm, sources close to the board said. Lazaridis, abandoning the company's competitive advantage in the hopes consumers would embrace yet another touchscreen was too risky a strategy, setting up the showdown at the board last year. In the end, management agreed to continue developing the Q10 keyboard phone.
But the all-touchscreen Z10 would be launched first. By the time the first BlackBerry 10 smartphones were unveiled in January of this year, market observers generally agreed that the products were two years too late — a view widely shared among many senior RIM insiders. Everyone underestimated the complexity" involved in building the new system. For 20 years, Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis operated in tandem, building an increasingly successful partnership that allowed each other's strengths to flourish.
They shared an office in their early years, even possessing each other's voice mail passwords. As RIM grew, they worked in separate buildings but spoke several times a day. But they had different personalities and their lives seldom intersected outside the office. They have barely spoken since leaving the company. For Mr. Lazaridis, science was both a job and a pastime. Balsillie was brash, competitive and athletic, and wore his reputation for being aggressive, even bullying in meetings, as a badge of honour.
Easy-going, they would kill BlackBerry.
The two rarely disagreed on key strategic moves — until their last year together. Balsillie wasn't so sure. Balsillie was concerned that Google had commoditized the smartphone market by making its Android operating system available for free to any handset maker. By , wireless carriers were warning him that they would be ordering fewer BlackBerry products unless he dropped his prices to match rival manufacturers.
More than 90 per cent of that was profit. Carriers tried to chip away at those fees — Google and Apple didn't charge them — but RIM always pushed back. Balsillie was particularly insistent on keeping the service fees. But the executives knew the company's weakening position in devices would increase pressure on services revenues as well. Even after its terrible year in , RIM still had several advantages, including close relationships with the world's major carriers.
It also had BlackBerry Messenger. RIM developers created the BBM app in to enable users to communicate not by e-mail but by using their devices' "personal identification numbers" or PINs. It was the first instant messaging service built for wireless devices, and it caught on quickly. It was reliable, free, always on and users could send as many messages as they wanted at no extra cost, unlike basic text messages.
PINs were random codes, not phone numbers or e-mail addresses, enhancing privacy. That made BBM extremely popular in countries where citizens didn't enjoy as many freedoms as Western democracies, and helped drive handset sales there. BBM's developers added a few clever elements that also made it addictive. For example, users would know when a message had been delivered and when it had been read, marked D and R.
Today there are 60 million monthly active users. Today Kik, boasts 85 million users, more than BlackBerry which sued Mr. Livingston for allegedly copying its program. Others, such as WhatsApp, are even larger. Instant messaging "is the killer app of the mobile era," Mr. Livingston said. RIM's Mr. Brown believed he could tap into this unfolding trend. While working with Mr. Balsillie on other projects, around late and early , he began to talk up the concept of offering BBM on other mobile platforms. Balsillie loved it. At the time, some carriers were pushing for rebates on their monthly service fees.
Brown was willing to comply if the carriers would agree to open new parts of their business to RIM. He and Mr. Balsillie struck upon an idea: Why not give carriers the opportunity to offer BBM to all their customers — no matter what devices they used? Most wireless executives were not fans of instant messaging services and other "over-the-top" apps such as Skype because they eroded the carriers' revenue from text messaging. To counter that threat, carriers banded together to develop a standardized "rich communication service" RCS platform that would enable their customers to exchange text messages, videos, games and other digital information.
But the initiative has gained little traction; one commentator recently labelled RCS a "zombie technology. Balsillie began floating the idea that carriers could instead offer BBM as their own enhanced version of text messaging, generating revenue for carriers while providing a cut for RIM. He called it "SMS 2. Brown discussed several options. For example, carriers could offer BBM as part of a standard "talk and text" plan for entry-level smartphone users. Because of its extra functions, BBM would save customers from having to buy a data plan.
Or, carriers could offer an expensive plan that included BBM and other offerings from BlackBerry, including one gigabyte of cloud storage on which they could keep photos or songs. The carriers could then sell extra services such as radio through BBM. It would also make the wireless companies' customers "stickier" — less likely to defect — since they couldn't move stored data to rival mobile carriers as easily.
The SMS 2. It was a chance to make BBM the dominant chat messaging service, and would have created a new story. A few carriers responded positively to Mr. Balsillie's initial entreaties and by mid, he was calling SMS 2. To round out the strategy, and build a suite of cross-platform services, RIM made a few acquisitions, such as instant messaging firm LiveProfile. But the plan deeply divided the company.
BBM was still an important driver of BlackBerry sales. Making it widely available to competitors represented an added threat to RIM's faltering handset business, led by Mr. Heins at the time. Balsillie and proponents of his plan felt that would be too late. These carriers were looking for a solution and this was a potential solution. One former executive felt Mr. Balsillie was overestimating the revenue potential of his software-driven strategy. As Mr.
Balsillie talked up SMS 2. Heins and his team increasingly cast doubt on it internally. As for Mr. Lazaridis, he was supportive of launching BBM for rival operating systems, but was concerned about the costs and risks involved in building out the SMS 2. Like others, Mr.
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Lazaridis worried about handset sales. But Mr. Balsillie was increasingly convinced that SMS 2. After pitching the plan to CEOs of 12 of the largest wireless carriers in the world in late , he believed he could sign up at least one major U. That's all it would take, he felt, to convince others to adopt BBM en masse. Balsillie was pushing to formally launch SMS 2. But with the company under mounting pressure to overhaul its top leadership, he and Mr. Lazaridis handed the reins to Mr. Heins in late January.
A few weeks later, Mr.
Heins killed the SMS 2. And if that meant getting rid of strategies that didn't fit, or weren't complete, or required resources, I think [Mr. Heins] did the right thing. The Globe and Mail requested interviews with Mr.
Heins and with Barbara Stymiest, the chair of the board. The company declined, but agreed to agreed to provide answers to written questions. Asked why he shelved SMS 2. Heins said in an e-mailed response: Balsillie, no longer an executive but still a board member, urged directors to reconsider, but they backed the new CEO. Balsillie couldn't abide by the decision. He resigned from the board in late March, then sold all his stock.